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Abstract 
Two aspects play a role in the household decision-making, the efficiency and the bargaining 
power’s argument. The crucial difference between the two approaches is the expected 
influence of personal and partners’ wage. To investigate which of the two models hold, in the 
Italian context, we estimate an ordered probit model for five aspects of household decision-
making. We use the Italian questionnaire of Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (It-Silc) 
2010 as it provides a module on intra-household sharing of resources. Results show that in 
strategic control decisions, where the power argument should dominate the efficiency 
approach (i.e. decisions on durable goods, savings and other important decisions) the 
spouse/partner with higher wage is the household decision maker. For decision regarding 
executive management (i.e. decision on everyday shopping), the efficiency argument holds. 
Keywords Financial management, Intra-household bargaining, Household 
production, Gender differences; Intra-household decision power; Family 
economics 
JEL Classification J12; D13; E21; G11 
 6 
 7 
Introduction 
This paper aims at providing evidence on the determinants of intra-household decision-
making power with respect to several outcomes, namely everyday shopping, purchase of 
durable goods, savings and taking relevant decisions. Exploring the process through which 
spouses/partners take a decision is important for better targeting any household policy 
interventions. In addition, from the economic viewpoint, it is important to analyse the degree of 
involvement of family members in economic decisions to state the consumer behaviour. 
In fact, the recent growing interest in understanding the household decision-making is driven 
by the effects that power’s distribution amongst components exerts on key economic 
outcomes, such as female labour force participation, how resources are distributed within the 
family, how household decisions are made in a variety of economic and non-economic 
contexts. A better knowledge of the determinants of power between partners can also provide 
significant information on gender inequality in household decision-making as well as its 
evolution over time. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on this topic is lacking of well-
established results, mainly because the evaluation of the spouse/partner’s power within the 
family is difficult to source because of the lack of detailed and useful data, which are based, 
once available, on self-reported measures. For instance, questions about who makes some 
decisions suffers from some important limitations as their interpretation can vary according to 
different individuals. Overall, several empirical studies consider that the comparative 
resources like income, education, health conditions, family size, age gap, and occupational 
status of spouses/partners play a significant role in the balance of power (see for instance 
Bertocchi et al., 2012). Further measures of bargaining power explored in the literature refer to 
the socio-economic environment, since social norms, cultural beliefs, and economic conditions 
are estimated to be relevant distribution factor in the household decision-making framework. 
A well-documented result is that economic variables, especially measured in terms of 
differences in the level of income and occupational status, are key factors in determining the 
most powerful partner. Gender differences emerge once the spouse/partner who takes the 
decision within the family is analysed. In particular, women are generally more risk averse, so 
once they are the decision maker in the household they tend to make less risky investments 
(see, Sundén and Surette, 1998; Jianakoplos and Barnasek, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2001; 
Guiso and Jappelli, 2002; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). It has also been found that income 
given to women is more likely to be used for investments in education, children’s nutrition and 
housing (Thomas, 1990; Duflo, 2003). Other studies underline that for women the degree of 
power in managing household’s decisions is positively correlated with their level of education 
and their status in the labour market (Lührmann and Maurer, 2007; Elder and Rudolph, 
2003).Woolley (2003) finds that the spouse/partner with the higher income is the one taking 
decisions in the household. Additional contributions provide evidence that who controls the 
income in the family - male or female - directly affects decisions and outcomes within the 
household, for instance in terms of child health and education, and expenditures for different 
goods and services (see Lundberg et al. 1997; Phipps and Burton, 1998; Duflo, 2003).  
In the economic literature, it is crucial to define, for a better interpretation of the distribution of 
power in the households, the theoretical framework in which family makes decisions, since 
household outcomes result from decisions made by spouses/partners. Consequently, the 
particular conditions under which a decision is made in the family matters. Chiefly, two 
theoretical models can be considered to deepen the household decision-making processes: 
the unitary and the bargaining model. The former approach underlines the hypothesis that 
households behave as a single decision unit where both spouses/partners have the same 
preferences or one of them takes all the decisions to somehow maximizes the welfare of its 
members, under the hypothesis of income pooling (Becker, 1991; Dobbelsteen and 
Kooreman, 1997), ignoring intra-household decisions completely. This model refers to a 
household production approach, where both spouses/partners allocate efficiently their time in 
all the family activities. Basically, it is assumed that partners freely decide how to allocate time 
to income work activities, to home production activities (i.e. the outcomes selected in our 
investigation: as everyday shopping, etc.), and to leisure, which are all exogenously 
determined. As a result, optimal decision-making entails that the spouse/partner with the lower 
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opportunity costs - measured in terms of income foregone - should devote more time to family 
production activities. It is clear that the partner in question is the one who is either not working 
or with the lower wage. The bargaining model, instead, assumes that each individual in the 
family has distinct preferences towards spending available household income, hence the final 
decision is the product of negotiation amongst partners rather than a choice driven by a single 
agent (Nash, 1950; Rubenstein, 1982). The optimal allocation of time results from the 
household maximizing its utility subjects to certain time, budget constraints and home 
production function, weighted by his/her power. Thence, in case of egoistic agents, each 
spouse/partner will maximize only his or her utility function, yielding a situation where the 
couple manages separately their resources and consumption. While, in case of cooperative 
behaviour between partners, the individual with higher wage rate has a greater bargaining 
power, hence he/she will raise his/her share in household financial management. 
Accordingly, in our empirical exercise for each outcome we test the prevailing model analysing 
the different effect plays by income. In the unitary model, the household decision maker is the 
spouse/partner with the lower opportunity cost, hence the one with the lowest wage. 
Consequently, a negative effect of income on each decision outcome entails that both 
partners’ time inputs into household management result from an efficient distribution of labour 
within the couple. While, the bargaining framework suggests that the spouse/partner who 
earns more, namely who has his/her wage positively correlated with the outcome, is the final 
decision maker. Accordingly, we may expect that the household production model may hold 
for routinely, less time-consuming and less important decisions. By contrast, the bargaining 
argument should be predominant for important and infrequent decisions. 
Following the theoretical frameworks described, we provide evidence of which model holds for 
each outcome in the Italian context. Using data drawn from the Italian questionnaire of 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (It-Silc), we estimate the role of spouse/partner’s 
characteristics in different decisions, ranked according to their degree of relevance. Results 
show that in strategic control decisions, where the power argument should dominate the 
efficiency approach (such as decisions on durable goods, savings and important decisions) a 
positive correlation between wages and degree of power played by the spouse/partner is 
found. By contrast, about decision related to executive management (for example decision on 
everyday shopping), in which the household production approach should dominate, the 
bargaining power argument holds. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section offers a description of the data. Section 3 
discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 provides the corresponding results. Finally, 
conclusions are reported in section 5.  
1. Data and definition of dependent variables 
We make use of the 2010 Italian questionnaire of Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(It-Silc) as it provides a module on the list of target secondary variables relating to intra-
household sharing of resources. The data are based on a standardized questionnaire filled by 
individuals and households in several European countries and on several issues. The Italian 
component (It-Silc) contains information on demographic characteristics, personal income, 
housing conditions, employment and so on at household and individual‘s level. Any 
component of the family, aged 16 and over, is eligible to answer the questionnaire. Chiefly, we 
focus on five variables related to five different aspects of decision making within the family. 
We define those variables as follows and we report the corresponding questions: the first 
concerns EverydayShopping, the question is: “Thinking of you and your spouse or partner, 
who is more likely to take decisions on everyday shopping?” All expenses on everyday 
shopping are to be covered, including expenses made by the respondent for himself or 
herself. 
The second variable is named Durable as it concerns decision on durable goods, the 
associated question is the following: “Thinking of you and your spouse or partner, who is more 
likely to take decisions on expensive purchases of consumer durables and furniture?”. Durable 
consumption includes one-off purchases of items such as white goods (fridges, washing-
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machines), larger pieces of furniture, electrical appliances, and so on, acquired by households 
for final consumption (i.e. those that are not used by households as stores of value or by 
unincorporated enterprises owned by households for purposes of production). These items 
may be used for purposes of consumption repeatedly or continuously over a period of a year 
or more (source OECD). 
The third variable is about Borrowing money; partners are asked to answer the following 
question: “Thinking of you and your spouse or partner, who is more likely to take decisions on 
borrowing money?”.The respondent has to include the decisions on mortgages and loans, too. 
The fourth variable is about Savings, and couples are asked to answer the following 
questions: “Thinking of you and your spouse or partner, who is more likely to take decisions 
on the use of savings?”. 
The final variable is related to ImportantDecision. The associated question is the following: 
“Thinking of you and your spouse or partner who is, on the whole, more likely to have the last 
word when taking important decisions?” 
The aforementioned questions are addressed to the same target population i.e. persons aged 
16 and over living in a household with at least a partner living in the household. They reflect 
different aspect of decision making grades from the less important (first variable) to the most 
important (fifth variable). 
Moreover, the different questions reveal different types of decision making authority, in 
particular, according to Vogler and Pahl (1994), it is plausible to distinguish between strategic 
control (i.e. important and infrequent decision such as decisions on durable goods, borrowing 
money and savings) and executive management (i.e. decision that are time consuming such 
as everyday shopping) decisions. 
The individual level is vital for this question as it asks for a subjective perception of decision 
making in the household. Consequently, we look at personal level answer even though there 
is inconsistency in the responses. Inconsistency emerges when the partners in the couple 
provide different answers to the same question; if, for example, both persons in the household 
answer that they are more likely to take decisions on a specific subject. 
The variable are coded as follows: (i) 1 More me (i.e. I decide), (ii) 2 Balanced (i.e. we both 
decide), (iii) 3 More my partner (i.e. my partner decides). The variables 2 and 3 have 
additional values in the responses, first there is an additional code defined as the decision has 
never arisen, and for the variable 3 an additional one defined as we do not have common 
savings. However, those values are filled by a small number of individuals, less than 1% that’s 
why we include them in the missing category.  
Finally, we recode the dependent variable in order to be interpreted always as women power 
(i.e. the higher the code to more likely the wife to decide) in both men and women estimates.  
1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of our dependent variables. For each question the 
answers of each respondent within the couple has been shown. Individuals can answer to 
each question in three different ways: I decide, we both decide, my partner decides. We cross 
the answers of males and females and in the table the rows report the percentages of males 
answering on the specific item, while the columns underline the corresponding figure for 
women. 
Table 1 shows that roughly, the 88% of the cases 1  agree about who decides on daily 
shopping, and more than half of respondents report to take decision on everyday shopping 
jointly. Everyday shopping can be seen as a time-consuming activity and a routine-like 
decision, hence the efficiency argument is probably more persuasive and the household 
production approach may hold (Dobbelsteen and Kooreman 1997). The role of the women in 
this context is well established, in fact 33.3% of men report that their spouse/partner 
completely decide about everyday shopping while only the 5.8% state that they decide by 
themselves. Overall 48.9% of the family decide together on everyday shopping. The 
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percentage of men and women answering that they are the only responsible for the everyday 
shopping is higher than the percentage stated by their spouses/partners: for instance 38.8% 
of females declare that they decide on this item, while 37.2% of males answer that their 
partners decide on it (the corresponding figure is 8.1% and 7.6% for males). 
  
Woman's answer 
  
EverydayShopping Durable goods 
  
MAN BOTH WOMAN Total MAN BOTH WOMAN Total 
M
a
n
's
 a
m
s
w
e
r 
MAN 5.8% 1.5% 0.8% 8.1% 8.8% 2.1% 0.3% 11.3% 
BOTH 1.0% 48.9% 4.7% 54.7% 1.6% 78.7% 1.2% 81.5% 
WOMAN 0.7% 3.2% 33.3% 37.2% 0.3% 1.8% 5.1% 7.3% 
Total 7.6% 53.6% 38.8% 100.0% 10.8% 82.6% 6.6% 100.0% 
 
Borrowing Saving 
MAN 9.9% 2.1% 0.3% 12.3% 7.0% 1.9% 0.2% 9.1% 
BOTH 1.8% 80.9% 0.9% 83.6% 2.4% 81.2% 1.2% 84.9% 
WOMAN 0.2% 1.0% 2.9% 4.1% 0.4% 1.7% 3.9% 6.0% 
Total 11.9% 84.1% 4.0% 100.0% 9.8% 84.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
 
Important decision 
    
MAN 10.9% 2.6% 0.7% 14.3% 
    
BOTH 1.8% 71.7% 2.1% 75.6% 
    
WOMAN 0.5% 2.0% 7.6% 10.2% 
    
Total 13.3% 76.3% 10.4% 100.0% 
    
Table 1   (cell percentages) 
The question is “Thinking of you and your spouse or partner, who is more likely to take decisions on…?” 
About decisions regarding strategic control, i.e. important and infrequent decision (see for 
instance Vogler and Pahl 1994) such as purchasing durable goods as well as decision on 
savings, we notice that the common practice is to decide all together. About 80% of couples 
decide together on durable goods (78.8%), borrowing money (80.9%), and savings decisions 
(81.2%). In contrast with executive management, in the choices where the power aspect may 
dominate the efficiency argument, only few women decide on their own (5.1% for durable 
goods, 2.9% for borrowing money and 3.9 % on savings)2. Another important difference 
observed in Table 1 is on the discrepancy in the answers. Partners sometimes disagree, as 
we do find discrepancy in the answers, i.e. partners do not answer in the same way to the 
question. The highest relative percentage of disagreement corresponds to the figure on 
everyday shopping. There are several explanations for the discrepancies in the answers 
provided and the most convincing one, in our opinion, is that respondents are not aware of 
their authority within the family. Of course it could be also that men and women perceive the 
world differently and\or they do not want to admit any authority of their partners. Sometimes 
partners overestimate their power, in particular, in our sample, for daily decisions, sometimes 
partners underestimate their decision’s power within the family, for instance, in our sample, for 
important and infrequent decisions. In fact, females underestimate their power within the 
family with regards of durable goods and savings, in fact only 5.3% (6.6% for durable goods) 
of them think they can decide on their own, while 6.0% (7.3% for durable goods) of males 
                                                          
2
 Percentages refer to answers where partner agree (i.e. percentages on the diagonal). 
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answer that their partners decide. By contrast, male tend to over-estimate their power in all the 
decisions, but savings.  
About the distribution of answers for the Important Decision, in other words, who take the final 
decision on the purchase of important items; males prefer to have the last word, as 10.9% of 
them think they can decide on their own. Only 7.6 % of women has such power.  
Finally, among strategic control decisions we can distinguishes between infrequent decisions 
such as purchasing durable goods where the cooperation (partners answering ‘we both take 
this decision’) between partners is high and important decisions such as who has the final 
word where the cooperation is low. What emerges is a sort of specialization within the couple: 
women in the daily expensive and men in important decisions (i.e. ‘who has the right of the 
last word’). This could be not intuitive given that we should expect that financial decisions 
would have been those showing a higher level of specialization but they are usually taken 
together. 
2. Method 
As we have already described, two aspects (i.e. household production model and bargaining 
model) play a role in the household decision making (see Dobbelsteen and Kooreman, 1997) 
and the crucial difference between the two is the expected influence of partners’ wage. To 
investigate which of the two model hold, in the Italian context, we estimate an ordered probit 
model for each of the five aspect of household decision making. We use observations for both 
spouses/partners and we discuss only estimates on the sample restricted to couples for which 
both spouses/partners have chosen the same answer categories. However, we test our 
assumptions also for all the sample including the observations for which there is no agreement 
amongst the partners and the results are still in line with the restricted sample. 
The relevant variable to check, whether the prediction of the model holds, is the wage rate of 
the partners. We believe that potential wage is most important in explaining the two 
approaches than actual wage. This is because the actual wage can be determined both from 
a personal decision on whether accepting or not a job along with the degree of difficulties to 
find a job in the labour market. Moreover, it can be determined by partner’s wage. A woman 
with a positive value on income means that she has a paid job and this may provide 
bargaining power in another form: woman who works outside their home may learn social and 
other skills needed to navigate the work environment and this may translate back into 
increased bargaining power within the house (Doss, 2012). To disentangle the effect of 
potential wage on decision making, we use four approaches: first we include in the estimation 
the education of both partners as a proxy of potential wage, second we include also a dummy 
indicating whether the wage of the partner is higher than the one of the respondent. Third, we 
use the predicted wages imputed to the all sample and estimated by a wage equation that 
uses only individual that do have wages. Finally, we use the actual wage imputing the 
predicted only to individuals that have no wages3.  
We also define the categories to ease interpretation in the bargaining framework: the power of 
women is Dijw
*k and it increases with higher value of the codes in the answer: Di0w
k is the 
probability that the man takes the decision, Di1w
k is the probability that both partners take the 
decision and Di2w
k is the probability that woman decides. We take into consideration five types 
of decisions identified by k. Then, we estimate separately for men and women the following 
ordered probit: 
Dijw
*k = β1yim + β2yiw + α’X + ui    (1)   With k=1,…, 5 and i=1,…, N 
Where yim and yiw are the variables of interest such as wages (as defined above) and X is a set 
of control variables (such as age, age difference, health, whether cohabiting, and so on). We 
test whether β1 and β2, are greater or not than zero. Considering Di0w
k if β1≤0 and β2≥0 
household production model holds, otherwise power argument may be used to interpret 
                                                          
3
 Results on wage equation are not reported for the sake of brevity but are available upon request. 
Moreover for the specification with the potential income we calculate the boostrap standard errors. 
 12 
results. Considering Di2w
k if β1≥0 and β2≤0 household production model holds, otherwise power 
argument may be used to interpret results. We expect that the income of women have less 
effect on the decision of men given women are usually secondary earner in family, then β2 
should be less significant.  
We consider also the potential income estimating separately for individual younger than 65 
(i.e. we estimate for them labour income) and individual older than 64 (i.e. we estimate for 
them pension income). 4The estimated income take into consideration the opportunity cost of 
reduce or give away a work and this is more important for women that are the ones with a lot 
of zero for income variable. Moreover, we expected that women engaged in time consuming 
decisions (such as daily shopping) are also those that have greater difference between 
potential and effective income, for this reason when considering Di0w
k , β2≤0 for potential 
income and β2≥0 for actual income, while when considering Di2w
k the opposite is true.  
3. Estimates 
As stated, the dependent variables considered have three different values going from 1 to 3 
suggesting that at the higher value is associated a greater female’s power. Consequently, the 
dependent variable, for both men and women, has to be interpreted as a measure of women’s 
power in taking decisions. The interpretation of a negative (positive) coefficient on a particular 
covariates means that the wife is less (more) likely to decide. Tables 2a and 2b show 
estimates for the sample of couples for which partners have agreed with the answers. To ease 
the interpretation of results we also provide marginal effects for all the outcomes (see Tables 
3a-7b). We remind to the reader that the coding of the answer is the following: 1 if man takes 
the decision, 2 if both spouses/partners take the decision and 3 if female decides. We are 
aware that our final sample (Tab.2a and 2b) could be a selected one given that partners 
agreed on answer, but results are still robust and do not change when also not homogeneous 
answers are included. 5 
In each estimate, we include four different specifications, which are reported in separate 
columns, namely (i) wage proxied by the level of education of both partners, (ii) dummy on 
whether the partner’s wage is higher than the respondent’s wage, (iii) the potential wage 
imputed for all sample as described above (iv) the actual wage for the entire sample. The 
potential wage is predicted for each individual in the sample according to the estimation of a 
wage equation using the Heckman approach (estimates of Heckman probit are not reported 
here but are available upon request). The wage equation is calculated on those individuals 
who report a positive wage separated for men and women and we distinguish between 
income from labour and income from pension. For labour income, regressors in the wage 
equation are age, education and geographical area, while the restriction variable is number of 
components less than 16 years old. For income composed by pension, the explanatory 
variables in the income equation are education, if a person has ever worked and his/her 
health’s conditions while the restriction variable is age.  
Table 2a and 2b reports estimates for men and women, respectively. Focusing on the main 
variables (i.e. income) we find that, β1 is positive and/or β2 is negative for executive 
management decision (i.e. decision on everyday shopping), thus for such item the assumption 
of household production model holds. However, for strategic control decisions (i.e. decisions 
on durable goods, borrowing, savings and important decisions) the power argument 
dominates the efficiency approach given that β1 is negative and/or β2 is positive. Overall, every 
time women have a higher level of education, they are more likely to decide, and this result 
still holds when we include a dummy controlling for the situation where the partner has a 
greater income than respondent has. The effect is stronger for men about decisions on 
durable goods and important decision. Regarding the bargaining power model, we do find that 
                                                          
4
 We estimate four wage equations as described in the next section.(two for labour income and to for 
pension income and for males and females). 
5
 All these estimates are available upon request. 
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for decision about important and infrequent items if the man has higher income than woman,, 
he is more likely to decide.  
Furthermore, when we include potential and actual wage, we do find the same predictions: for 
everyday shopping decisions, the higher the actual wage of the individual the less likely is the 
probability that he/she decides. The opposite is true for decisions on durable goods, on 
savings and important decisions. Thus, the power argument holds. This result may entail that 
the breadwinner within the family plays a central role when the amount to be spent is 
important, while he/she empowers the partner for less costly expenditures. 
Looking at the marginal effects (Tables 3a-7b) we can analyse the effect of the 
aforementioned variables on the probability that the man is the decision making, the 
probability that both partners take the decision and the probability that woman decides. In 
particular we find that if the man is the breadwinner in the household the power of the wife 
increases on everyday shopping decisions (about of 4.4 percentage points - pp). This result 
suggests an efficiency way of assigning tasks and responsibility within the family. Moreover, 
we do find that it is much important in explaining the decision power within the family the 
difference in wages than the level of them. In fact, the dummy variable regarding whether the 
partner has an income higher than the respondent is always significant and, for everyday 
shopping decisions, it increases the probability that the woman decides of about 4.4 (pp). This 
is the highest effect of this variable given that for strategic control decision (purchase of 
durable goods, borrowing, savings and important decisions) if man (woman) has higher 
income than his (her) partner, the probability that woman decides decreases (increases) of 
about 2 pp. In these last decisions in fact, the power arguments holds given that individuals 
with higher income are the ones who decide regardless the gender (the corresponding figure 
for men is about 2.6 pp for durable goods, 4.3 pp for borrowing and 2.4 pp for saving and 
important decisions). Thus, the estimates underline that the person who takes decisions is the 
individual that earns more in the family. The log of potential income is not significantly different 
from zero in almost all equations. For important decisions we do find that it increases the 
probability that a woman decides of about 1 pp (men’s equation) and for savings we find that 
the log of men potential income increases the probability that he decides of about 2 pp (men’s 
estimates) and 3 pp (women’s estimates). With regard to the actual income, it decreases the 
probability that a partner takes decision on everyday shopping of about 0.5 pp for men and 1.2 
pp for women (Table 3a and 3b). Moreover for decisions on durable goods purchase, 
borrowing money and savings only males’ income is significantly difference from zero and it 
reduces the probability that a woman decides of about, 0.5 pp, 0.7 pp and 0.9 pp, respectively 
(Tab. 4b, 5b and 6b). This is true also when we look at man estimates (Tab. 4a, 5a and 6a) 
but the effect is slightly higher. Concerning the everyday shopping decisions, once we control 
for females’ potential income in the males’ equation, the greater probability of being a decision 
maker for females (about 2.5 pp) reveals that there is a positive difference between the 
potential income and actual income for women more devoted to daily time-consuming 
activities instead of being at work.  
With reference to the other control variables, it seems that female’s power increases as age 
elapsed by, reaching the maximum at age 50 once we consider the outcome about everyday 
shopping decision. Up to 50 years old, the higher the age the less likely is male to decide 
according to his spouse/partner, after 50 years old this relationship is at the opposite. Table 
2b reports estimates for men and results do not underline any differences between men and 
women on age, expect for the turning point that for men is around 53 years of age. However, 
when we take into consideration the differences in age of the spouses/partners, we notice that 
the spouse/partner that he/she is older than the other one is the one who is more likely to take 
decision. Especially, with regard to everyday shopping, the probability of being the one who 
decide is larger for men than for women, when men are older than their spouses/partners. 
Moreover, we do find differences in age among decisions. In particular, for everyday shopping 
and saving decisions the probability that men decide increases by 0.03 and 0.05 pp for any 
additional year of age, however it decreases by 0.05 pp on durable goods decisions and it is 
not significant in other strategic control decisions. Not surprisingly, health is strongly correlated 
with everyday decisions: individuals with bad health are more likely to let their partner deciding 
for each decision considered, and this is true regardless the respondent and the specifications 
considered. We also find that cohabiting people instead of married couple are more likely to 
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take decisions on everyday shopping jointly, suggesting a more collaborative behaviour in 
couple not legally related. In case of non-cooperation in everyday shopping is the man who is 
in charge of taking the decision. Particularly, men who cohabit declare that are more likely to 
decide on their own (about 2 pp) or with their partner (about 4 pp) than those who are married. 
 When the male is the one who earns more in the household, the women is more likely to take 
everyday shopping decisions, but if we include in the specification the women’s potential 
income, we find that females are more likely either to take joint decisions or to leave the 
responsibility to her spouse/partner. Education plays a role only in strategic control decisions 
where the more educated partner is the one who decides. Not surprisingly, we do not find 
differences in all the decisions regarding to health: unhealthy individuals leave their partners 
to decide more frequently. Moreover, only for important or on everyday shopping decisions, 
we find significant geographical differences, namely in the North women have more power 
than in the South given that their partners leave them to decide more often with regard the 
aforementioned questions (1.3pp and 3pp, respectively).  
Finally, looking at the observed and predicted probabilities, we can see that for strategic 
control decisions, couples are more likely to decide all together (around 80%), while for 
executive management decision only 50% of couple declare that they both decide. In fact, for 
the last category (i.e. everyday shopping) it is more likely that wives decide..  
4. Conclusion 
This paper aimed at investigating the determinants of intra-household decision-making power 
with respect to several outcomes, namely everyday shopping, purchase of durable goods, 
savings and taking relevant decisions. In particular, our goal has been to test two potential 
models: the first related to a household production (efficiency) approach, where both 
spouses/partners allocate efficiently their time in all the family activities. The optimal allocation 
of time results from the household maximizing its utility subject to certain time and budget 
constraints and the home production function. Alternatively, in the second model, financial 
management is a reflection of bargaining power. Thus in this framework both partners have 
diverse utility functions, so their preferences may differ. 
What emerges is that the household production model shows a negative correlation between 
a partner’s wage rate and his/her participation in financial management while the second 
model predicts a positive correlation between a partner’s wage rate and with whom he/she is 
the decision making. 
Using data drawn from the It-Silc 2010, we estimated the role of spouse/partner’s 
characteristics in several decisions, ranking the answers provided according to the degree of 
power given to women. Results show that in strategic control decisions, where the power 
argument should dominate the efficiency approach (such as decisions on durable goods, 
savings and important decisions) a positive correlation between wages and the degree of 
powerful played by the spouse/partner is found. We estimate that the presence of a higher 
income of one partner decreases the decision’s probability of the other. By contrast, with 
regard to decisions related to executive management (for example decisions on everyday 
shopping), in which the household production approach should dominate, the opposite is true. 
Overall, what emerges is that there is a specialization within the family on time-consuming 
activities, with females more devoted to daily decisions (i.e. everyday shopping decisions), but 
the breadwinner in the family is the one who is more active in taking more costly decisions, 
such as purchase of durable goods and borrowing decisions. 
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Everyday Shopping Durable Borrowing Savings Important Decision 
 
I Ii iii iv i ii iii iv i ii iii iv i ii iii iv i ii iii iv 
Main 
Variables                     
β1 
                    
Ym(Potential)  
 
-0.0317 
   
0.0597 
   
-0.0117 
   
-0.1360** 
   
0.0592 
 
Ym 
   
0.0455*** 
   
-0.0286 
   
-
0.0802***    
-
0.0871***    
-0.0026 
β2 
                    
Yw>Ym 
 
-
0.1146***    
0.1650*** 
   
0.2655*** 
   
0.1769*** 
   
0.1301*** 
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
0.0657** 
   
0.0139 
   
0.0656 
   
0.0466 
   
0.0655 
 
Yw 
   
-0.0233 
   
0.00 
   
0.002 
   
0.0115 
   
0.0097 
Man's edu 
                    
Secondary -0.0391 -0.0317 
  
0.0628 0.0523 
  
0.0616 0.0431 
  
0.1244** 0.1126** 
  
0.0005 -0.008 
  
Compulsory 0.0307 0.041 
  
0.1183** 0.1042* 
  
0.2040*** 0.1819*** 
  
0.2805*** 0.2640*** 
  
0.0436 0.0321 
  
Woman's 
edu                     
Secondary 0.0292 0.0155 
  
-
0.1411*** 
-0.1224** 
  
-0.0287 0.001 
  
-0.0457 -0.0275 
  
-0.1113** -0.0968** 
  
Compulsory -0.0821* -0.1075** 
  
-
0.2117*** 
-
0.1776***   
-
0.2018*** 
-0.1504** 
  
-0.1245** -0.0873 
  
-
0.2103*** 
-
0.1831***   
Man X 
                    
Age 0.0270*** 0.0271*** 0.0188*** 0.0260*** -0.0056 -0.0059 -0.0105 -0.0054 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0119 0.0001 -0.0151* -0.0155* -0.0195* -0.0132 0.0031 0.0027 -0.0083 0.0022 
Age squared 
-
0.0003*** 
-
0.0003*** 
-
0.0002*** 
-
0.0003*** 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00 0.0001 0.00 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.00 0.00 0.0001 0.00 
Mage>Wage -0.0059** -0.0061** -0.0064** -0.0053 -0.0074** -0.0070** -0.0073* -0.0075* -0.0084** -0.0078* -0.0086** -0.0086* -0.0061 -0.0058 -0.0066 -0.0061 -0.0048 -0.0045 -0.0052 -0.0047 
Fair Health 
-
0.1363*** 
-
0.1380*** 
-
0.1394*** 
-
0.1390*** 
-
0.2743*** 
-
0.2737*** 
-
0.2716*** 
-
0.2719*** 
-
0.2636*** 
-
0.2650*** 
-
0.2721*** 
-
0.2683*** 
-
0.3455*** 
-
0.3451*** 
-
0.3508*** 
-
0.3475*** 
-
0.1985*** 
-
0.1978*** 
-
0.1979*** 
-
0.1971*** 
Good Health 
-
0.1451*** 
-
0.1495*** 
-
0.1433*** 
-
0.1520*** 
-
0.3124*** 
-
0.3084*** 
-
0.3131*** 
-
0.3023*** 
-
0.3008*** 
-
0.2954*** 
-
0.3083*** 
-
0.2903*** 
-
0.4079*** 
-
0.4037*** 
-
0.4196*** 
-
0.4134*** 
-
0.2091*** 
-
0.2055*** 
-
0.2049*** 
-
0.1987*** 
Couple X 
                    
Cohabiting 
-
0.1748*** 
-
0.1686*** 
-
0.1742*** 
-
0.1730*** 
-0.0394 -0.0515 -0.0362 -0.0373 -0.0835 -0.0994 -0.0799 -0.0832 0.0144 0.0039 0.0188 0.0165 -0.0156 -0.0247 -0.0133 -0.0122 
N.comp<15yr
s 
0.0194 0.0169 0.0296 0.0176 -0.0352* -0.0323 -0.0361* -0.0323* -0.0557** -0.0507** -0.0484** -0.0515** -0.0550** -0.0516** -0.0440* -0.0518** -0.029 -0.0264 -0.0232 -0.026 
Center 0.0215 0.0203 0.026 0.0187 0.0159 0.018 0.0127 0.0302 0.0705 0.0723 0.0708* 0.0933** 0.0361 0.0381 0.0458 0.0481 0.0855** 0.0868** 0.0819** 0.0975*** 
North 0.0766*** 0.0743*** 0.0774*** 0.0705** -0.0277 -0.0238 -0.0382 -0.0149 0.0182 0.0223 0.013 0.0427 -0.0592 -0.0566 -0.0438 -0.0426 0.0879*** 0.0907*** 0.0735** 0.0963*** 
Cut 1 
-
0.8713*** 
-
0.8918*** 
-0.8306* 
-
0.7704*** 
-
1.7647*** 
-
1.7301*** 
-
1.3602*** 
-
1.9975*** 
-
1.5153*** 
-
1.4708*** 
-
1.8201*** 
-
2.3554*** 
-
1.7749*** 
-
1.7342*** 
-
2.7614*** 
-
2.4374*** 
-
1.3028*** 
-
1.2685*** 
-0.1495 
-
1.2862*** 
Cut 2 0.8597*** 0.8400*** 0.8993** 0.9598*** 0.9204*** 0.9584*** 1.3223*** 0.6858** 1.3948*** 1.4519*** 1.0801* 0.5494* 1.1196*** 1.1656*** 0.1255 0.4524 1.0496*** 1.0867*** 2.2001*** 1.0627*** 
Observations 9883 9883 9883 9883 10184 10184 10184 10184 7643 7643 7643 7643 9103 9103 9103 9103 10132 10132 10132 10132 
Table 2a Coefficient Ordered Probit: Men 
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Main 
Variables 
Everyday Shopping Durable Borrowing Savings Important Decision 
β1 I Ii iii iv I Ii iii iv I Ii iii iv I Ii iii iv I Ii iii iv 
Ym(Potential) 
  
-0.0548   
  
0.0103     
 
-0.0786     
 
-0.1937***     
 
0.0303   
Ym 
   
0.0361* 
   
-0.0425**   
  
-0.0970***   
  
-0.1054***   
  
-0.0116 
β2 
   
  
   
    
  
    
  
    
  
  
Ym>Yw 
 
0.1162*** 
 
  
 
-0.1676*** 
 
    -0.2606*** 
 
    -0.1824*** 
 
    -0.1188*** 
 
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
-0.002   
  
-0.0502     
 
-0.0274     
 
-0.0303     
 
0.0195   
Yw 
   
-0.0303** 
   
-0.0056   
  
-0.012   
  
0.0019   
  
0.0049 
Man's edu 
   
  
   
    
  
    
  
    
  
  
Secondary -0.042 -0.034 
 
  0.0644 0.053 
 
  0.0686 0.0489 
 
  0.1294** 0.1166** 
 
  0.0001 -0.0082 
 
  
Compulsory 0.0407 0.0523 
 
  0.1362** 0.1204** 
 
  0.2351*** 0.2107*** 
 
  0.3099*** 0.2912*** 
 
  0.0554 0.0437 
 
  
Woman's edu 
   
  
   
    
  
    
  
    
  
  
Secondary 0.0361 0.0227 
 
  -0.1365*** -0.1179** 
 
  -0.0246 0.0038 
 
  -0.0419 -0.0238 
 
  -0.1067** -0.0938** 
 
  
Compulsory -0.0688 -0.0932** 
 
  -0.1982*** -0.1649*** 
 
  -0.1879*** -0.1398** 
 
  -0.1132* -0.0761 
 
  -0.1991*** -0.1751*** 
 
  
Woman X 
   
  
   
    
  
    
  
    
  
  
Age 0.0340*** 0.0345*** 0.0352*** 0.0340*** 0.0036 0.0028 0.0095 0.0049 0.0105 0.0084 0.015 0.014 -0.0016 -0.0025 0.0041 0.001 0.0075 0.0068 0.0042 0.0076 
Age squared -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 0 0 0 0 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 0 0 0 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 
Wage>Mage 0.0082*** 0.0084*** 0.0090*** 0.0081** 0.0034 0.0031 0.0038 0.0042 0.0063 0.0059 0.0073* 0.0074* 0.0084** 0.0082** 0.0094** 0.0082** 0.0061** 0.0059* 0.0067** 0.0071** 
Fair Health 0.2512*** 0.2464*** 0.2486*** 0.2500*** 0.1624*** 0.1710*** 0.1645*** 0.1640*** 0.3195*** 0.3404*** 0.3111*** 0.3161*** 0.2988*** 0.3095*** 0.2873*** 0.2896*** 0.1713*** 0.1762*** 0.1720*** 0.1722*** 
Good Health 0.2100*** 0.2079*** 0.2137*** 0.2109*** 0.1569*** 0.1619*** 0.1634*** 0.1661** 0.3040*** 0.3163*** 0.3008*** 0.3103*** 0.2463*** 0.2524*** 0.2308*** 0.2316*** 0.1684*** 0.1706*** 0.1759*** 0.1795*** 
Couple X 
   
  
   
    
  
    
  
    
  
  
Cohabiting -0.1628*** -0.1558*** -0.1623*** -0.1619*** -0.0277 -0.0408 -0.0232 -0.026 -0.0644 -0.0812 -0.061 -0.0669 0.0281 0.0162 0.0307 0.0284 -0.0072 -0.016 -0.0036 -0.0039 
N.comp<15yrs 0.0268 0.0241 0.0312* 0.0253 -0.0323 -0.0292 -0.0366* -0.0288 -0.0532** -0.0480** -0.0512** -0.0490** -0.0491** -0.0453* -0.0429* -0.0453** -0.0258 -0.023 -0.0234 -0.0224 
Center 0.0176 0.0158 0.0297 0.0145 0.0129 0.0156 0.0207 0.0276 0.0684 0.0715 0.0849* 0.0920** 0.034 0.0372 0.0567 0.047 0.0819** 0.0839** 0.0852*** 0.0942*** 
North 0.0680** 0.0647** 0.0825*** 0.0626** -0.0377 -0.0326 -0.03 -0.023 0.0102 0.0162 0.0327 0.0375 -0.0696* -0.0652* -0.0323 -0.0498 0.0788*** 0.0826*** 0.0762*** 0.0886*** 
Cut 1 -0.5111*** -0.4161** -1.0275** -0.4432* -1.0195*** -1.1620*** -1.2303** -1.3952*** -0.5892** -0.8286*** -1.5827** -1.6084*** -1.1659*** -1.3245*** -3.3611*** -2.2378*** -0.9229*** -1.0272*** -0.4116 -0.8815*** 
Cut 2 1.3215*** 1.4182*** 0.8032* 1.3884*** 1.9016*** 1.7650*** 1.6870*** 1.5230*** 2.5668*** 2.3446*** 1.5618** 1.5425*** 2.0195*** 1.8684*** -0.1849 0.9411*** 1.6358*** 1.5341*** 2.1434*** 1.6735*** 
 Observations  9883 9883 9883 9883 10184 10184 10184 10184 7643 7643 7643 7643 9103 9103 9103 9103 10132 10132 10132 10132 
Table 2b Coefficient Ordered Probit: Women 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Main 
Variables   
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
β1   
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Ym(Potential)   
  
  
  0.0038 0.00838 -0.0122   
 
  
Ym   
  
  
    
 
  -0.00534*** -0.0122** 0.0176** 
β2   
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Yw>Ym   
  0.0142*** 0.0295*** -0.0437***   
 
    
 
  
Yw(Potential)   
  
  
  -0.00789** -0.0174** 0.0253**   
 
  
Yw   
  
  
    
 
  2.73E-03 6.25E-03 -8.99E-03 
Man's edu 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Secondary 0.00473 0.0103 -0.015 0.00386 0.0083 -0.0122   
 
    
 
  
Compulsory -0.00352 -0.00837 0.0119 -0.00471 -0.0112 0.0159   
 
    
 
  
Woman's edu 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Secondary -0.00317 -0.00821 0.0114 -0.00164 -0.0044 0.00604   
 
    
 
  
Compulsory 0.00974* 0.0219* -0.0316* 0.0126** 0.0288** -0.0414**   
 
    
 
  
Man X 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Age 0.000290** 0.000667** -0.000957** 0.000283** 0.000653** -0.000936** 0.000306** 0.000675** -0.000981** 0.000366*** 0.000839** -0.00121*** 
Mage>Wage 0.000685** 0.00157** -0.00226** 0.000712** 0.00164** -0.00235** 0.000766** 0.00169** -0.00245** 0.00062 0.00142* -0.00204* 
Fair Health 0.0145*** 0.0388*** -0.0533*** 0.0146*** 0.0394*** -0.0540*** 0.0152*** 0.0391*** -0.0543*** 0.0147*** 0.0397*** -0.0544*** 
Good Health 0.0155*** 0.0412*** -0.0567*** 0.0159*** 0.0425*** -0.0584*** 0.0157*** 0.0401*** -0.0558*** 0.0163*** 0.0431*** -0.0594*** 
Couple X 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Cohabiting 0.0230*** 0.0429*** -0.0659*** 0.0220*** 0.0416*** -0.0636*** 0.0234*** 0.0419*** -0.0653*** 0.0228*** 0.0424*** -0.0652*** 
N.comp<15yrs -0.00226 -0.0052 0.00747 -0.00197 -0.00455 0.00652 -0.00356 -0.00783* 0.0114 -0.00206 -0.00473 0.00679 
Center -0.00263 -0.00559 0.00822 -0.00248 -0.0053 0.00779 -0.00326 -0.00665 0.00991 -0.00229 -0.00486 0.00715 
North -0.00900*** -0.0205*** 0.0295*** -0.00870*** -0.0199*** 0.0286*** -0.00934** -0.0204*** 0.0297*** -0.00830** -0.0189** 0.0272*** 
N.Obs. 9,883 9,883 9,883 9,883 9,883 9,883 9,883 9,883 9,883 9,883 9,883 9,883 
Obs. Prob. 6.64% 55.58% 37.78% 6.64% 55.58% 37.78% 6.64% 55.58% 37.78% 6.64% 55.58% 37.78% 
Pred.Prob. 5.86% 54.36% 39.77% 5.85% 54.39% 39.77% 6.05% 54.73% 39.21% 5.88% 54.36% 39.76% 
Table 3a Marginal Effect at Mean - Everyday Shopping Men 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Main 
Variables   
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
β2 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.000231 0.000559 -0.000791   
 
  
Yw 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.00344** 0.00828* -0.0117* 
β1 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Ym>Yw 
  
  -0.0140*** -0.0305*** 0.0445*** 
  
    
 
  
Ym(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.00621 0.015 -0.0212   
 
  
Ym 
  
  
  
  
  
  -0.00410** -0.00986** 0.0140* 
Woman's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Secondary -0.00384 -0.0102 0.0141 -0.00236 -0.00651 0.00887 
  
    
 
  
Compulsory 0.00796 0.0186 -0.0265 0.0107** 0.0253* -0.0360** 
  
    
 
  
Men's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Secondary 0.00498 0.0111 -0.0161 0.00405 0.009 -0.013 
  
    
 
  
Compulsory -0.00452 -0.0113 0.0158 -0.00583 -0.0145 0.0203 
  
    
 
  
Woman X 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Age 0.0000411 0.0000987 -0.00014 0.0000324 0.0000783 -0.000111 0.000139 0.000337 -0.000476 0.000083 0.000199 -0.000282 
Wage>Mage -0.000934*** -0.00224*** 0.00318*** -0.000950*** -0.00229*** 0.00324*** -0.00101*** -0.00245*** 0.00347*** -0.000923*** -0.00222*** 
0.00314**
* 
Fair Health -0.0322*** -0.0627*** 0.0949*** -0.0315*** -0.0616*** 0.0931*** -0.0319*** -0.0620*** 0.0939*** -0.0321*** -0.0623*** 0.0944*** 
Good Health -0.0278*** -0.0511*** 0.0788*** -0.0273*** -0.0508*** 0.0781*** -0.0281*** -0.0522*** 0.0803*** -0.0279*** -0.0513*** 0.0792*** 
Couple X 
  
  
  
  
  
    
  
Cohabiting 0.0207*** 0.0410*** -0.0617*** 0.0196*** 0.0395*** -0.0591*** 0.0205*** 0.0411*** -0.0616*** 0.0205*** 0.0408*** 
-
0.0614*** 
N.comp<15yrs -0.00305 -0.00733 0.0104 -0.00273 -0.0066 0.00934 -0.00354* -0.00856* 0.0121* -0.00287 -0.0069 0.00977 
Center -0.00209 -0.00467 0.00676 -0.00187 -0.00422 0.00608 -0.00353 -0.00788 0.0114 -0.00171 -0.00385 0.00556 
North -0.00775** -0.0185** 0.0263** -0.00735** -0.0177** 0.0250** -0.00941*** -0.0225** 0.0319*** -0.00713** -0.0171** 0.0242* 
N.Obs.  9,883  9,883  
            
9,883  
9,883  9,883  
            
9,883  
9,883  9,883  
            
9,883  
 9,883  9,883  
          
9,883  
Obs. Prob. 6.64% 55.58% 37.78% 6.64% 55.58% 37.78% 6.64% 55.58% 37.78% 6.64% 55.58% 37.78% 
Pred.Prob. 5.65% 54.14% 40.20% 5.63% 54.15% 40.22% 5.63% 54.00% 40.37% 5.65% 54.11% 40.24% 
Table 3b Marginal Effect at Mean - Everyday Shopping Women 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Main 
Variables             
β1 
            
Ym(Potential) 
      
-0.0103 0.00407 0.00627 
   
Ym 
         
0.00488 -0.00184 -0.00305 
β2 
            
Yw>Ym 
   
-0.0262*** 0.00712*** 0.0191*** 
      
Yw(Potential) 
      
-0.00242 0.000953 0.00146 
   
Yw 
         
2.24E-06 -8.43E-07 -1.40E-06 
Man's edu 
            
Secondary -0.0115 0.0054 0.00609 -0.00948 0.00438 0.0051 
      
Compulsory -0.0209** 0.00889* 0.0120** -0.0183* 0.00767 0.0106** 
      
Woman's edu 
            
Secondary 0.0214*** -0.00406*** -0.0173*** 0.0189*** -0.00429*** -0.0146** 
      
Compulsory 0.0337*** -0.00906*** -0.0246*** 0.0284*** -0.00816*** -0.0203*** 
      
Man X 
            
Age -0.000537** 0.000204** 0.000333** -0.000522** 0.000199** 0.000323** -0.000513** 0.000202* 0.000311* -0.000404* 0.000152* 0.000252 
Mage>Wage 0.00127** -0.000482** -0.000788** 0.00120** -0.000456** -0.000739** 0.00126** -0.000498* -0.000766** 0.00129* -0.000485** -0.000804** 
Fair Health 0.0389*** -0.00272 -0.0362*** 0.0389*** -0.00305 -0.0358*** 0.0391*** -0.00346 -0.0356*** 0.0389*** -0.00316 -0.0358*** 
Good Health 0.0456*** -0.00547* -0.0402*** 0.0450*** -0.00556* -0.0394*** 0.0464*** -0.00659* -0.0398*** 0.0443*** -0.00534* -0.0389*** 
Couple X 
            
Cohabiting 0.00689 -0.00282 -0.00407 0.00905 -0.0038 -0.00524 0.0064 -0.0027 -0.00371 0.00651 -0.00264 -0.00388 
N.of comp<15y 
rs 
0.00602* -0.00229* -0.00373* 0.0055 -0.0021 -0.0034 0.00626* -0.00247** -0.00379** 0.00552* -0.00208* -0.00344* 
Center -0.00267 0.000927 0.00174 -0.003 0.00106 0.00195 -0.00214 0.00076 0.00138 -0.00507 0.00176 0.00331 
North 0.00476 -0.00185 -0.00291 0.00409 -0.0016 -0.0025 0.00665 -0.00267 -0.00398 0.00258 -0.00101 -0.00158 
Observations 10,184 10,184 10,184 10,184 10,184 10,184 10,184 10,184 10,184 10,184 10,184 10,184 
Observed 
Probability 
9.54% 84.91% 5.55% 9.54% 84.91% 5.55% 9.54% 84.91% 5.55% 9.54% 84.91% 5.55% 
Predicted 
Probability 
9.65% 85.17% 5.18% 9.62% 85.24% 5.14% 9.83% 85.05% 5.11% 9.66% 85.12% 5.22% 
Table 4a Marginal Effect at Mean - Durable- Men 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Main 
Variables   
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
β2 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.00836 -0.00274 -0.00562   
 
  
Yw 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.000942 -0.000327 
-0.000616 
 
β1 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Ym>Yw 
  
  0.0263*** -0.00646*** -0.0198*** 
  
    
 
  
Ym(Potential) 
  
  
  
  -0.00172 0.000565 0.00116   
 
  
Ym 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.00715* -0.00248* 
-0.00467** 
 
Woman's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Secondary 0.0206*** -0.00354** -0.0170** 0.0181** -0.00383** -0.0143** 
  
    
 
  
Compulsory 0.0312*** -0.00758*** -0.0236*** 0.0262*** -0.00690*** -0.0193*** 
  
    
 
  
Men's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Secondary -0.0118 0.00544 0.00634 -0.00961 0.00437 0.00524 
  
    
 
  
Compulsory -0.0238** 0.00958** 0.0142*** -0.0209** 0.00832* 0.0126** 
  
    
 
  
Woman X 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Age -0.00101*** 0.000356*** 0.000650*** -0.000986*** 0.000353*** 0.000634*** -0.000848*** 0.000278*** 0.000570*** -0.000910*** 0.000315*** 0.000594*** 
Wage>Mage -0.000573 0.000203 0.000371 -0.00052 0.000186 0.000334 -0.000625 0.000205 0.00042 -0.000709 0.000246 0.000463 
Fair Health -0.0298*** 0.0138** 0.0160*** -0.0313*** 0.0146** 0.0167*** -0.0299** 0.0134* 0.0165*** -0.0302** 0.0140** 0.0161*** 
Good Health -0.0289*** 0.0135** 0.0154*** -0.0298*** 0.0142** 0.0157*** -0.0297** 0.0133* 0.0164*** -0.0305*** 0.0142** 0.0164*** 
Couple X 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
-0.00574 
Cohabiting 0.00475 -0.00179 -0.00297 0.00703 -0.00274 -0.00429 0.00392 -0.00136 -0.00256 0.00445 -0.00163 -0.00317 
N.of comp<15 
yrs 
0.00546 -0.00193 -0.00353 0.00493 -0.00176 -0.00317 0.00608* -0.00200* -0.00409* 0.00485* -0.00168 0.00312 
Center -0.00212 0.000662 0.00146 -0.00256 0.000819 0.00174 -0.00335 0.000968 0.00239 -0.00453 0.00141 -0.00251 
North 0.00641 -0.00232 -0.00409 0.00554 -0.00203 -0.00351 0.00502 -0.00170 -0.00332 0.00392 -0.00141 0.000594*** 
N. Obs. 10,184  10,184  10,184  10,184  10,184  10,184  10,184  10,184  10,184  10,184  10,184  10,184  
Obs. Prob. 9.54% 84.91% 5.55% 9.54% 84.91% 5.55% 9.54% 84.91% 5.55% 9.54% 84.91% 5.55% 
Pred. Prob. 9.49% 85.14% 5.37% 9.47% 85.21% 5.32% 9.30% 85.16% 5.54% 9.45% 85.12% 5.43% 
Table 4b Marginal Effect at Mean - Durable- Women 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Main Variables 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
β1 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Ym(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.00218 -0.00144 -0.000747   
 
  
Ym 
  
  
  
    
 
  0.0145*** -0.00921*** -0.00532*** 
β2 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Yw>Ym 
  
  -0.0431*** 0.0231*** 0.0200***   
 
    
 
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
  
  
  -0.0122 0.00805 0.00419   
 
  
Yw 
  
  
  
    
 
  -3.61E-04 2.29E-04 1.32E-04 
Man's edu 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Secondary -0.0126 0.00932 0.00331 -0.00869 0.00639 0.0023   
 
    
 
  
Compulsory -0.0385*** 0.0258*** 0.0127*** -0.0338*** 0.0226** 0.0112***   
 
    
 
  
Woman's edu 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Secondary 0.0046 -0.00236 -0.00224 -0.000172 0.0000955 0.0000769   
 
    
 
  
Compulsory 0.0363*** -0.0228*** -0.0135*** 0.0273** -0.0177*** -0.00958**   
 
    
 
  
Man X 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Age -0.000235 0.000151 0.0000837 -0.000202 0.000131 0.0000707 -0.000137 0.0000901 0.0000469 -0.0000497 0.0000315 0.0000182 
Mage>Wage 0.00153** -0.000987** -0.000547** 0.00141* -0.000913* -0.000492* 0.00161** -0.00106** -0.000552** 0.00156* -0.000987** -0.000570* 
Fair Health 0.0403*** -0.0182*** -0.0221*** 0.0405*** -0.0189*** -0.0216*** 0.0425*** -0.0199*** -0.0226*** 0.0412*** -0.0186*** -0.0226*** 
Good Health 0.0472*** -0.0228*** -0.0245*** 0.0461*** -0.0226*** -0.0235*** 0.0494*** -0.0246*** -0.0248*** 0.0453*** -0.0213*** -0.0240*** 
Couple X 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Cohabiting 0.0159 -0.0108 -0.00507 0.019 -0.0132 -0.00582* 0.0155 -0.0108 -0.00478 0.0158 -0.0106 -0.00516 
N. comp<15 rs 0.0101** -0.00653** -0.00362** 0.00919** -0.00597** -0.00322** 0.00903* -0.00594* -0.00309* 0.00933** -0.00592** -0.00342** 
Center -0.0127 0.00802 0.00468 -0.013 0.00828 0.00467 -0.0130* 0.00837 0.00464 -0.0168** 0.0105** 0.00626* 
North -0.00338 0.00223 0.00115 -0.00413 0.00275 0.00137 -0.00247 0.00167 0.000804 -0.00793 0.0052 0.00273 
N. Obs. 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 7,643 
Obs. rob. 10.61% 86.34% 3.05% 10.61% 86.34% 3.05% 10.61% 86.34% 3.05% 10.61% 86.34% 3.05% 
Pred.Prob. 10.54% 86.62% 2.84% 10.46% 86.78% 2.76% 10.89% 86.33% 2.78% 10.45% 86.63% 2.91% 
Table 5a Marginal Effect at Mean - Borrowing Men 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Main Variables 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
β2 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.00484 -0.00292 -0.00191   
 
  
Yw 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.00212 -0.00129 -0.000829 
β1 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Ym>Yw 
  
  0.0415*** -0.0214*** -0.0201*** 
  
    
 
  
Ym(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.0139 -0.00839 -0.00549   
 
  
Ym 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.0171*** -0.0104*** -0.00668*** 
Woman's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Secondary 0.00387 -0.00191 -0.00196 -0.000614 0.000329 0.000285 
  
    
 
  
Compulsory 0.0330*** -0.0200*** -0.0130*** 0.0248** -0.0156** -0.00918** 
  
    
 
  
Men's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Secondary -0.014 0.0103 0.00372 -0.00983 0.0072 0.00263 
  
    
 
  
Compulsory -0.0434*** 0.0283*** 0.0151*** -0.0384*** 0.0251*** 0.0133*** 
  
    
 
  
Woman X 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Age -0.000883*** 0.000548*** 0.000335*** -0.000839*** 0.000528*** 0.000311*** -0.000646* 0.000391** 0.000256** -0.000736*** 0.000449** 0.000288** 
Wage>Mage -0.00112 0.000698 0.000427 -0.00104 0.000655 0.000386 -0.00129* 0.000778* 0.000509* -0.00130* 0.000794 0.000509* 
Fair Health -0.0660*** 0.0489*** 0.0172*** -0.0704*** 0.0527*** 0.0177*** -0.0638*** 0.0465*** 0.0173*** -0.0653*** 0.0481*** 0.0172*** 
Good Health -0.0634*** 0.0473*** 0.0161*** -0.0663*** 0.0503*** 0.0160*** -0.0621*** 0.0455*** 0.0166*** -0.0643*** 0.0475*** 0.0168*** 
Couple X 
  
  
  
  
  
    
  
Cohabiting 0.0119 -0.00773 -0.00413 0.015 -0.0101 -0.005 0.0111 -0.00706 -0.00405 0.0122 -0.00787 -0.00437 
N.comp<15rs 0.00947** -0.00587** -0.00359** 0.00852** -0.00536** -0.00316** 0.00904** -0.00546** -0.00357** 0.00864* -0.00527** -0.00338** 
Center -0.012 0.00723 0.00474 -0.0125 0.00769 0.0048 -0.0148* 0.00883* 0.00602* -0.0161* 0.00965* 0.00644** 
North -0.00184 0.00118 0.00067 -0.00294 0.00190 0.00103 -0.00590 0.00370 0.00220 -0.00678 0.00429 0.00249 
N. Obs. 7,643  7,643  7,643  7,643  7,643  7,643  7,643  7,643  
           
7,643  
7,643  7,643  7,643  
Obs. rob. 10.61% 86.34% 3.05% 10.61% 86.34% 3.05% 10.61% 86.34% 3.05% 10.61% 86.34% 3.05% 
Pred.Prob. 10.18% 86.84% 2.97% 10.14% 86.99% 2.87% 10.07% 86.83% 3.09% 10.08% 86.87% 3.05% 
Table 5b Marginal Effect at Mean - Borrowing - Women 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Main Variables 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
β1 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Ym(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.0200** -0.00883** -0.0112**   
 
  
Ym 
  
  
  
    
 
  0.0126*** -0.00530*** -0.00730*** 
β2 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Yw>Ym 
  
  -0.0235*** 0.00728*** 0.0162***   
 
    
 
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
  
  
  -0.00686 0.00303 0.00384   
 
  
Yw 
  
  
  
    
 
  -1.66E-03 6.98E-04 9.61E-04 
Man's edu 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Secondary -0.0215** 0.0134* 0.00812** -0.0192* 0.0119* 0.00739**   
 
    
 
  
Compulsory -0.0439*** 0.0226*** 0.0213*** -0.0409*** 0.0208*** 0.0201***   
 
    
 
  
Woman's edu 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Secondary 0.00609 -0.00189 -0.00419 0.00374 -0.00131 -0.00243   
 
    
 
  
Compulsory 0.0176** -0.00690** -0.0107* 0.0124 -0.00507 -0.00733   
 
    
 
  
Man X 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Age 0.000446* -0.000191* -0.000255** 0.000459** -0.000198* -0.000261** 0.000488** -0.000215** -0.000273** 0.000452** -0.000190* -0.000262** 
Mage>Wage 0.000887 -0.00038 -0.000507 0.000835 -0.00036 -0.000475 0.000965 -0.000425 -0.000539 0.000879 -0.00037 -0.000509 
Fair Health 0.0382*** 0.00101 -0.0392*** 0.0382*** 0.000582 -0.0388*** 0.0391*** 0.000922 -0.0400*** 0.0382*** 0.00191 -0.0401*** 
Good Health 0.0475*** -0.00331 -0.0442*** 0.0469*** -0.00349 -0.0434*** 0.0495*** -0.00403 -0.0455*** 0.0480*** -0.00257 -0.0454*** 
Couple X 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Cohabiting -0.00206 0.000861 0.0012 -0.000561 0.00024 0.000321 -0.00273 0.00117 0.00157 -0.00237 0.000963 0.0014 
N. comp<15yrs 0.00797** -0.00342** -0.00455** 0.00746** -0.00321** -0.00425** 0.00648** -0.00286** -0.00362* 0.00749** -0.00315** -0.00434** 
Center -0.00496 0.00176 0.0032 -0.00521 0.00187 0.00334 -0.00643 0.00243 0.00399 -0.00663 0.00236 0.00427 
North 0.00871 -0.00389 -0.00482 0.0083 -0.00373 -0.00457 0.00655 -0.00302 -0.00353 0.00627 -0.00277 -0.00349 
N. Obs. 9,103 9,103 9,103 9,103 9,103 9,103 9,103 9,103 9,103 9,103 9,103 9,103 
Obs. rob. 7.65% 88.14% 4.22% 7.65% 88.14% 4.22% 7.65% 88.14% 4.22% 7.65% 88.14% 4.22% 
Pred.Prob. 7.74% 88.45% 3.81% 7.70% 88.52% 3.77% 7.90% 88.32% 3.78% 7.72% 88.42% 3.87% 
Table 6a Marginal Effect at Mean - Saving - Men 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Main 
Variables   
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
β2 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.00424 -0.00153 -0.00272   
 
  
Yw 
  
  
  
  
  
  -0.000265 0.0001 0.000165 
β1 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Ym>Yw 
  
  0.0237*** -0.00626*** -0.0174*** 
  
    
 
  
Ym(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.0271*** -0.00974*** -0.0173***   
 
  
Ym 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.0149*** -0.00561*** -0.00928*** 
Woman's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Secondary 0.00549 -0.00151 -0.00398 0.00319 -0.00102 -0.00218 
  
    
 
  
Compulsory 0.0157* -0.00552** -0.0101* 0.0106 -0.00395 -0.00666 
  
    
 
  
Men's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Secondary -0.0224** 0.0137** 0.00864** -0.0199* 0.0121* 0.00781** 
  
    
 
  
Compulsory -0.0476*** 0.0230*** 0.0246*** -0.0443*** 0.0212*** 0.0231*** 
  
    
 
  
Woman X 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Age -0.0000953 0.000037 0.0000583 -0.0000752 0.0000295 0.0000457 0.0000911 -0.0000328 -0.0000584 -0.000113 0.0000424 0.0000701 
Wage>Mage -0.00119** 0.000461** 0.000727** -0.00116** 0.000455** 0.000703** -0.00131** 0.000471** 0.000838*** -0.00116* 0.000435** 0.000720** 
Fair Health -0.0481*** 0.0258*** 0.0223*** -0.0498*** 0.0270*** 0.0228*** -0.0452*** 0.0228** 0.0224*** -0.0460*** 0.0238*** 0.0222*** 
Good Health -0.0410*** 0.0235*** 0.0175*** -0.0421*** 0.0246*** 0.0176*** -0.0377*** 0.0206** 0.0171*** -0.0382*** 0.0214*** 0.0168*** 
Couple X 
  
  
  
  
  
    
 
  
Cohabiting -0.00392 0.00142 0.00249 -0.00227 0.000861 0.00141 -0.00422 0.0014 0.00282 -0.00394 0.00139 0.00255 
N.of 
comp<15yrs 
0.00695** -0.00270* -0.00426** 0.00641* -0.00252* -0.00389* 0.00600** -0.00216* -0.00384** 0.00640** -0.00241** -0.00399** 
Center -0.00453 0.00136 0.00317 -0.00495 0.00152 0.00343 -0.00758 0.00223 0.00535 -0.00631 0.0019 0.00441 
North 0.0100* -0.00406* -0.00594* 0.00936* -0.00386* -0.00551* 0 0 0 0.00716 0 0 
N. Obs. 9,103  9,103  9,103  9,103  9,103  9,103  9,103  9,103  9,103  9,103  9,103  9,103  
Obs. rob. 7.65% 88.14% 4.22% 7.65% 88.14% 4.22% 7.65% 88.14% 4.22% 7.65% 88.14% 4.22% 
Pred.Prob. 7.51% 88.45% 4.03% 7.49% 88.53% 3.98% 7.38% 88.42% 4.20% 7.48% 88.41% 4.11% 
Table 6b Marginal Effect at Mean - Saving - Women 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Main Variables 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
β1 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Ym(Potential) 
  
  
  
  -0.012 0.00311 0.00892   
 
  
Ym 
  
  
  
    
 
  0.000513 -0.000112 -0.000402 
β2 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Yw>Ym 
  
  -0.0244*** 0.00312*** 0.0213***   
 
    
 
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
  
  
  -0.0133 0.00345 0.00987*   
 
  
Yw 
  
  
  
    
 
  -1.92E-03 4.18E-04 1.50E-03 
Man's edu 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Secondary -0.000106 0.0000278 0.0000781 0.00161 -0.000412 -0.0012   
 
    
 
  
Compulsory -0.00864 0.00191 0.00673 -0.00634 0.00137 0.00497   
 
    
 
  
Woman's edu 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Secondary 0.0196** -0.0000882 -0.0195** 0.0173** -0.000632 -0.0167**   
 
    
 
  
Compulsory 0.0395*** -0.00484** -0.0346*** 0.0346*** -0.00474*** -0.0298***   
 
    
 
  
Man X 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Age 0.000369 -0.0000806 -0.000289 0.000381 -0.0000837 -0.000297 0.00036 -0.0000931 -0.000267 0.000580** -0.000126** -0.000453** 
Mage>Wage 0.000948 -0.000207 -0.000741 0.000888 -0.000195 -0.000693 0.00105 -0.000272 -0.000779* 0.00094 -0.000205 -0.000735 
Fair Health 0.0353*** -0.000683 -0.0346*** 0.0352*** -0.000916 -0.0343*** 0.0363*** -0.00277 -0.0335*** 0.0354*** -0.00123 -0.0342*** 
Good Health 0.0374*** -0.00122 -0.0362*** 0.0368*** -0.00131 -0.0355*** 0.0378*** -0.00319 -0.0346*** 0.0357*** -0.00132 -0.0344*** 
Couple X 
  
  
  
    
 
    
 
  
Cohabiting 0.00312 -0.000723 -0.0024 0.00496 -0.00119 -0.00376 0.00273 -0.000735 -0.00199 0.00243 -0.000554 -0.00187 
N. comp<15yrrs 0.00575 -0.00126 -0.00449 0.00521 -0.00114 -0.00407 0.00471 -0.00122 -0.00349 0.00516 -0.00112 -0.00403 
Center -0.0173** 0.00436** 0.0129** -0.0175** 0.00448** 0.0131** -0.0169** 0.00474** 0.0121*** -0.0198*** 0.00500*** 0.0148*** 
North -0.0177*** 0.00444** 0.0133*** -0.0183*** 0.00460** 0.0137*** -0.0152** 0.00439** 0.0108** -0.0195*** 0.00497*** 0.0146*** 
N. Obs. 10,132 10,132 10,132 10,132 10,132 10,132 
  
  
  
  
Obs. rob. 12.12% 79.48% 8.40% 12.12% 79.48% 8.40% 12.12% 79.48% 8.40% 12.12% 79.48% 8.40% 
Pred.Prob. 11.83% 79.73% 8.44% 11.81% 79.78% 8.41% 12.28% 79.57% 8.15% 11.87% 79.66% 8.47% 
Table 7a Marginal Effect at Mean - Important Decision - Men 
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VARIABLES 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman takes 
decision 
Man takes 
decision 
Both take 
decision 
Woman 
takes 
decision 
Main Variables 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
β2 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Yw(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.000845 -0.00387 0.00303 
  
  
Yw 
  
  
  
  
  
  -0.000973 0.000198 0.000775 
β1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Ym>Yw 
  
  0.0223*** -0.00286*** -0.0195*** 
  
  
  
  
Ym(Potential) 
  
  
  
  0.00131 -0.00602 0.00471 
  
  
Ym 
  
  
  
  
  
  0.00229 -0.000466 -0.00183 
Woman's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Secondary 0.0188** -0.0000679 -0.0187** 0.0168** -0.000567 -0.0162* 
  
  
  
  
Compulsory 0.0372*** -0.00426** -0.0330*** 0.0330*** -0.00425*** -0.0287*** 
  
  
  
  
Men's edu 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Secondary -0.0000222 0.00000587 0.0000163 0.00166 -0.000428 -0.00124 
  
  
  
  
Compulsory -0.0109 0.0023 0.00863 -0.00858 0.00177 0.00681 
  
  
  
  
Woman X 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Age -0.0000634 0.0000131 0.0000503 -0.000049 0.0000103 0.0000387 -0.00000505 0.0000231 -0.0000181 0.000106 -0.0000215 -0.0000842 
Wage>Mage -0.00121** 0.000250* 0.000957** -0.00117* 0.000245* 0.000924* 0.000289* -0.00132** 0.00103** -0.00140** 0.000284* 0.00111** 
Fair Health -0.0365*** 0.0122** 0.0243*** -0.0376*** 0.0126** 0.0249*** 0.0130** -0.0371*** 0.0241*** -0.0370*** 0.0127** 0.0243*** 
Good Health -0.0359*** 0.0121** 0.0239*** -0.0365*** 0.0124** 0.0240*** 0.0132** -0.0379*** 0.0247*** -0.0384*** 0.0129** 0.0255*** 
Couple X 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Cohabiting 0.00142 -0.000302 -0.00111 0.00318 -0.000713 -0.00247 -0.000158 0.000715 -0.000557 0.00077 -0.000159 -0.00061 
N. comp<15yrs 0.00508 -0.00105 -0.00402 0.00453 -0.000951 -0.00358 -0.00102 0.00466 -0.00364 0.00442 -0.000899 -0.00352 
Center -0.0164** 0.00386** 0.0125** -0.0168** 0.00404** 0.0128** 0.00416** -0.0172** 0.0130** -0.0189*** 0.00442** 0.0145*** 
North -0.0158*** 0.00377** 0.0120*** -0.0166*** 0.00400** 0.0126*** 0.00387** -0.0154** 0.0116** -0.0178*** 0.00427** 0.0136*** 
N. Obs. 10,132  10,132  10,132  10,132  10,132  10,132  10,132  10,132  10,132  10,132  10,132  10,132  
Obs. rob. 12.12% 79.48% 8.40% 12.12% 79.48% 8.40% 12.12% 79.48% 8.40% 12.12% 79.48% 8.40% 
Pred.Prob. 11.73% 79.74% 8.53% 11.73% 79.78% 8.49% 11.88% 79.65% 8.47% 11.73% 79.68% 8.59% 
Table 7b Marginal Effect at Mean - Important Decision – Women 
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